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Book abstract 
The Education of Radical Democracy explores why radical democracy is so necessary, difficult, and 
possible and why it is important to understand it as an educative activity. The book draws on critical 
social theory and critical pedagogy to explain what enables and sustains work for radical 
democratization, and considers how we can begin such work in neoliberal societies today. Exploring 
examples of projects from the nineteenth century to the present day, the book sheds light on a wealth 
of critical tools, research studies, theoretical concepts and practical methods. It offers a critical 
reading of the ‘crisis of hope’ in neoliberal capitalist societies, focusing on the problem of the 
‘contraction of possibilities’ for democratic agency, resistance to domination, and practices of 
freedom. It argues that radically democratic thinking, practice, and forms of social organization are 
vital for countering and overcoming systemic hegemonies and that these can be learned and 
cultivated. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Living on the Front of the world 
‘Changing the changeable world is the theory-practice of the realizably real 
Possible on the Front of the world, of the world process’ (Bloch 1985, p. 246). 
 
 
 
This chapter introduces Ernst Bloch’s concept of ‘the Front’ and illustrates how it can inform 
work for social justice and radical democracy within conditions of neoliberal capitalism.1 
Although it is mentioned in much academic writing about Bloch’s Principle of Hope, the 
concept of the Front is rarely theoretically unpacked or assessed for its usefulness in practice 
– despite the fact that it clarifies in philosophical terms a number of core assumptions about 
the nature of transformative social and political processes (including both learning and 
revolution). Indeed, it is particularly relevant for understanding both the location and the 
experiential nature of radical democracy, for the latter’s orientation to unsettling fixed 
parameters of possibility, ‘overhauling given facts’ and opening new spaces for participation 
in social life is one expression of a ‘driving in things in which our affairs can still be 
conducted, a Front in which our future, precisely this, can be decided’ (Bloch 1995, pp. 288, 
1376).  
 
The aim of this book, however, is not simply to recognize that there is this Front, but to 
explore the relationship of this concept to practices of critique and creativity, to understand 
more about what actually happens on ‘fronts’ of world process, and to consider how they may 
be either made visible or generated in everyday life. While radical democracy does not 
always take the form of ‘frontier politics,’ I argue that the perception, production, 
inhabitation, and pedagogy of the Front are among the most important elements of radical-
democratic activity in extreme neoliberal contexts. This is partly because they orient us 
towards spaces and times and possibilities of crafting emergent possibilities, and partly 
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because the they counteract both the foreclosure of radical inquiry and action and the 
production of political ontologies of collective hopelessness, or worlds ‘without Front’ 
(Bloch 1995, p. 5 Graeber 2009).2 In this chapter, I therefore consider how the concept of the 
Front may be used to map co-ordinates of hope on otherwise ‘flat’ surfaces of possibility, and 
how it can be conceived as the site of laboratories for revolutionary, practical–critical activity 
and learning. I then foray into a discussion of ‘abolition politics’ to illustrate how these 
concepts illuminate the types of learning, thinking, and methods that have sustained some of 
the most radical projects for humanization and democratization in modern history, and 
conclude with some reflections on the relationship between frontier politics and 
contemporary struggles for radical democracy.  
 
While Bloch clearly had a sense of the philosophical category of the Front and its 
significance for real-world practice, he does not offer a single (or indeed, any well-
developed) definition of this in his work. He refers to it variously as being the place of 
becoming of ‘the world, of world process’ (1995, p. 246) and of the ‘occurrence of reality’ (p. 
237); it is also a name for situations in which there is a dynamic movement of ‘that part of 
reality which is coming onto being on the horizon of the real’ (p. 68), and more specifically 
situations where ‘man [and woman] and process, or rather subject and object in dialectically 
materialist process’ come into relation with one another (p. 200). The last definition is really 
the crux, both for Bloch and for the radical democratic project in extreme neoliberal contexts 
today, for while it is on the one hand the definition of a metaphorical place, it also points 
towards a method of action. As he wrote, the human being 
 
‘everywhere is still living in prehistory, indeed all and everything still stands before 
the creation of the world, of a right world. True genesis is not at the beginning but at 
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the end, and it starts to begin only when society and existence become radical, i.e. 
grasp their roots. But the root of the history is the working, creating human being who 
reshapes and overhauls the given facts. Once he has grasped himself and established 
what is his, without expropriation and alienation, in real democracy, there arises in the 
world something which shines into the childhood of all and in which no one has yet 
been: homeland’ (p. 1376). 
 
‘Homeland’ for Bloch was democratic communism. As a German Jewish Marxist 
philosopher writing towards the middle of the twentieth century, his critique centred on the 
‘alienation, dehumanization, reification, [and] this Becoming Commodity of all people and 
things, which capitalism has to an increasing extent brought with it’ (p. 1358). In his view, 
Marxism was the only theory proper to this activity, and he argued that all struggles against 
the foreclosure of human striving were ultimately manifestations of this ‘red arrow’ as it was 
shot through history (p. 1358). Today, despite ongoing debates about Bloch’s political 
commitments and judgements (particularly his relationship to Soviet communism under 
Stalinism), it is not his communist vision that matters most – indeed, his ‘red arrows’ of hope 
belonged, even when he was writing, to a much broader family of political practices and 
imaginaries than he was able to imagine. It is rather his empirical and philosophical analysis 
of how human beings actively encounter the future – including their future selves – as 
‘undecided material, which can…be decided through work and concretely mediated action,’ 
and his argument that we can learn to create and work in such encounters, that remains most 
relevant for contemporary politico-educational work (p. 199). This activity is located on the 
‘Front’ of possibility, where hungers and desires are made conscious, embodied, and 
transformed through practical efforts to realize them here and now, in critical dialogue with 
both the obsolete and unfulfilled tendencies of the past and the not-yet-conscious and 
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emergent tendencies of the future. Whether the latter take shape as ‘little waking dreams’ or 
utopian ‘castles in the sky,’ the insertion of them as forces bearing upon present realities 
creates possibilities for people to engage with the world, each other, and themselves as 
unfinished projects.  
 
To live without hope that the future can be different and that we can be part of making it so, 
therefore, is to inhabit what Bloch called a ‘world without Front,’ when possibilities are 
diminished or foreclosed through the silencing of experience and desire (the negation of 
recognition), despair (the negation of future), totality (the negation of critique, excess, or 
outside), domination (the denial of movement), or death (nothing). We want to believe that 
we can refuse the futures given us and determine our own; that we can tend to and heal the 
pains of the present; and that we can experience joy, comfort, and liberation in everyday life. 
A world with a Front, on the other hand, is one in which things are in a state of play – open, 
hopeful, undetermined, multiple, free, and alive – and in which we have the space, time, 
knowledge and courage to think and act ‘towards changing the world and informing the 
desire to change it’ (Bloch 1995, p. 8). Whereas a world without Front is monotonous and 
flat, a world with Front is spatialized with different forms of possibility and resistance – some 
which are realized and evident; others residual, latent, or emergent – that can alter as we 
transform our knowledge of and relationship with them. Bloch even referred to possibility 
(that-which-is-not-yet) as being a ‘region’ of reality, arguing that ‘real possibility is the 
categorical In-Front-of-Itself of material movement considered as a process; it is the specific 
regional character of reality itself, on the Front of its occurrence’ (ibid., p. 237). 
 
Even extreme neoliberal societies, therefore, are not worlds entirely ‘without Front,’ but 
rather ones in which the possibilities of living on the Front are unequally distributed and 
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increasingly foreclosed for many – in which regions of reality as possibility are privatized or 
enclosed. But as established systems of social support and care fail harder in neoliberal 
societies, and as it becomes harder to defend even the most basic principles of democracy, 
justice, and autonomy within the parameters of legitimate thought and political action, 
everyday practices of freedom become increasingly radical. As Isham Christie (2011) has 
argued, ‘as socio-economic conditions continue to deteriorate and dissatisfaction in 
representatives grows, the response we are seeing is not cynicism or apathy’ but ‘the 
beginning of an awakening toward radical social change’ which recognises that ‘a liberal 
response to appease unrestrained capitalism and people’s interest is impossible.’ This 
awakening, however, does not automatically translate into either knowledge of how specific 
practices, institutions, and systems are loosened until they reach what might later appear to 
have been a sudden collapse, or into a courage which sustains work towards this end while 
they still remain intact. People struggle to imagine living either without or outside of 
capitalism when they try to imagine this becoming a material reality from within the confines 
of their political universes as already constituted, or with the proviso that they cannot live in 
opposition to the status quo. What they really mean, therefore, is that they have decided it is 
impossible for them to do the work that they sense is necessary for realizing this goal because 
they do not know how to pursue it from where they stand while remaining in that place, or 
because the forces of resistance against it seem too powerful to resist, or because the danger 
of punishment and loss outweighs both possibilities of joy and ethical demands – and 
therefore have decided that all imaginable efforts to reclaim the present and steer the future in 
better directions are destined to be inadequate and unsuccessful. In this depoliticized mode of 
hoping, they are often correct.  Yet this is not the only mode, and not an educated one. 
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One of the best-kept secrets of social theory, and a foundational premise of radical 
democracy, is that possibility is political – its expansion and generation an objective of 
politico-educative work, not simply (or often not even possibly) a condition for it. Relations 
of domination are most durable when people believe that they are not only permanent, 
inevitable, and natural but also desirable (i.e., that they are free within it or liberated through 
it), and while it remains possible for them to engage in other practices of freedom and 
resistance without challenging the fundaments. This is why ‘the question of what is possible 
and impossible is really at stake in every situation’ and not the thing that frames every 
situation, and why the most interesting fronts appear wherever the location of this boundary, 
and thus the general distribution of possibilities, is challenged (Rancière 2009). As the 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu put it most succinctly, 
 
‘the relation to the possible is a relation to power; and the sense of the probable future 
is constituted in a prolonged relationship with a world that is structured according to 
the categories of the possible (for us) and the impossible (for us), of what is 
appropriated in advance by and for others and what one can reasonably expect for 
oneself’ (1990, p. 64). 
 
Without a concept of the Front, our habitual ways of going along without prodding at the 
common-sense limits of what is possible can lead to, as Bourdieu put it, ‘cutting one’s coat to 
fit the cloth’ – we make do, conform, adapt, cultivate resilience or resentment. This is a 
practice of freedom of sorts, as it demands that we ‘co-operate in the various ways of going 
forward’ which are predetermined by power (Tully 2002, p. 540). Where these ways are 
imperfect, incomplete, or inadequate for particular people and purposes, it may be possible to 
‘raise a problem about the rule of the practice in the languages of communication and 
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legitimation or challenge a relation of governance on the ground’ in ways that do not 
challenge the foundational parameters of possibility. While this affords slightly more 
autonomy, it remains a kind of deferred determinism in so far as the organizing principles and 
boundaries of the possible remain unquestioned, and the possibility of their transformation 
depends on the openness, willingness, and ability of the system’s defenders to challenge and 
reform them. But there are also situations in which people decide that the underlying rules of 
the game and conditions of possibility deny practices of freedom as such, and thus that an 
entire ‘mode of acting together and its constitutive forms of relational subjectivity’ can be 
challenged and changed (Tully 2002, p. 542). When people inhabit this stance with their 
bodies and minds and time and energy and words they create new ‘fronts’ of possibility, and 
here begin ‘dreaming inside history’ (Shor and Freire 2003, p. 479).  
 
The front as a co-ordinate of hope 
 
The Front is not a place; at least, not a fixed physical location that we can locate with a map. 
It is rather a contingent co-ordinate for the nomadic, always-already-possible but not-yet-
actual situation in which established parameters of possibility are unsettled, in which it 
becomes possible to work most critically and creatively with the ‘undecided material’ of the 
present, and in which ‘the Unbecome is located and seeks to articulate itself’ (Bloch 1985, 
pp. 148 and 199). We can conceive of macro-institutional fronts (in the sense of engaging a 
system on ‘all fronts’) as well as fronts of micro-power where systems of power secure 
themselves by policing norms, desires, and identities; fronts can emerge within our 
encounters with ourselves as well as with one another (Foucault 1971, p. 230). Sometimes 
they look like spectacular events, but we can also see their contours in moments of authentic 
dialogue, struggles for dignity and recognition, radical changes in personal and political life, 
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and the articulation of new common understandings. Such situations constitute the ‘Front of 
world process’ because possibilities for change are intensified and multiplied whenever 
people channel intellectual and political energy into questioning social foreclosures and 
creating new definitions of reality (what Bloch called the ‘living-theory practice of 
comprehended tendency’). This active, subjective element distinguishes the Front from 
related notions of limits or obstacles. The latter refer to things that block practices of freedom 
and foreclose possibility: powerful institutions and institutional power, physical domination, 
hegemonic discourses that stifle critique and imagination, material insufficiencies and 
inequalities, and so on. However, these are merely the contexts in which a Front might be 
created through possibility-enabling activities through which the material of the now is 
negotiated through social activity. 
 
The ‘multifarious hope landscape’ constituted by such fronts is a terrain of freedom, 
possibility, and hope. Once we realize that there are new worlds potentially coming over the 
horizon everywhere – what Gibson–Graham call the ‘ontology of a politics of possibility’ – 
then our own horizon of possibility is more easily enlarged (2006, p. xxvii). The more we 
learn about the different ways people have turned limits into frontiers, and about the ways 
they have transformed certain limits of possibility to make room for alternatives, the more we 
can have faith in this approach. The more we understand how power works through language, 
ethics, habits, relationships, emotions, needs, and desires, the more we can orient our thinking 
away from abstract forces that we presume exist beyond ourselves and focus on the practice 
of possibility itself.  
 
Thresholds, boundaries, edges, borders, borderlands, horizons, zones of proximal 
development, liminal spaces, and symbolic and material frontiers – all these concepts 
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sensitize us to the fundamental problem of possibility. They are also important within radical 
democratic politics, which gravitates towards fronts of possibility by striving to disclose, 
unsettle, dissolve, transgress, transform, relocate, and refuse contingent limitations; to 
challenge static concepts, identities, and relationships; to refuse necessities imposed by 
domination; encourage encounters with difference that deepen respect for common life; and 
to visualize possibilities that do not yet quite exist. As a defining strategy of power in 
neoliberal societies is the parameterization of possibility through the suppression or 
foreclosure of these very activities, a better grasp on the ‘possibility-disclosing practices’ 
which generate them is imperative (Kompridis 2006).  
 
The concept of the Front suggests that people do not occupy either a smooth plane of infinite 
possibilities or a state of ‘structural enclosure,’ but rather in historically constituted and 
socially unequal fields within which only some possibles can be concretely realized at 
particular times and in which all are constantly in process. Judith Butler’s work on gender 
and sexuality has been particularly useful for clarifying the productive capacity of power to 
create conditions of social existence by naturalizing certain borders of identity, truth, and 
possibility and marking them off from others. ‘If I have any agency,’ she writes, ‘it is opened 
up by the fact that I am constituted by a social world I never chose’ (and a world that may in 
fact attempt to delegitimize my very existence). However, ‘that my agency is riven with 
paradox does not mean it is impossible. It means only that paradox is the condition of its 
possibility’ (Butler 2004, p. 3). In other words, we may be dependent upon the very norms 
and conditions that we need to undo. While this paradox is a condition of possibility, it is not 
necessarily a front of possibility. To make it thus, we have to decide: ‘do I establish myself in 
the terms that would make my life valuable, or do I offer a critique of the reigning order of 
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values?’ (Butler 2012) The act of throwing oneself into this situation and seeking its ‘leading 
edges’ of possibility, not the sheer fact of the situation itself, is what constitutes it as a front.  
 
Similarly, it is possible to define possibility as a ‘distribution of positions’ that filters ‘what 
can be seen, what can be said and what can be thought of as being possible. A situation 
defines a set of possibilities, and the impossible is the limit’ (Rancière and Liang 2009). But 
this only becomes a front if we work on ‘crossing the border of the impossible’ both 
intellectually and materially. Some theorists concentrate on how such border-crossing is 
actually accomplished. John Holloway’s theory of revolution, for example, revolves around 
the constituent power of what people do in the ‘cracks on the edge of impossibility,’ within 
which, he argues, we can break from capitalist rationality through thinking, feeling, and 
acting autonomously. While these spaces themselves are not necessarily fronts of possibility, 
any act 'to recover the subject negated by objectivity, to emancipate the power-to 
metamorphosed into power-over, is to struggle to open each moment as a moment of 
possibility' (Holloway 2010, p. 235). The cracks that interest Holloway are not those that we 
can discover, but ones we create; here, ‘crack’ is a verb, and it has a dual character. On the 
one hand, he describes it as ‘a real and constant clash. We fling ourselves over and over again 
against the advancing walls, and we get hurt. We scream until the ice cracks, and then watch 
as it freezes over again. Our cracks exist, but they exist on the edge of impossibility’ (ibid., p. 
71). On the other hand, because ‘we are the heat cracking the ice,’ because we are venturing 
beyond, this activity can also be a joyful experience of going beyond what is given as 
possible. As Freire remarked, ‘in order for the oppressed to be able to wage the struggle for 
their liberation they must perceive the reality of oppression not as a closed world from which 
there is no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform’ (2000, p. 49). 
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Towards the end of The Principle of Hope, Bloch paints a picture of a land in which people 
wish to build their own houses (i.e., to live in self-determining ways) but must do so in an 
‘inhospitable world’ full of social and political resistances – some so strong that they 
overpower even the desire for dwelling (p. 1331). Rather than being a hopeless world, 
however, it is an image of a world with front; a situation that demands and compels us to 
become a ‘working, creating human being who reshapes and overhauls existing facts – 
including the facts of one’s own subjectivity (p. 1376). This is not capitalist work, wage 
labour (which Bloch regarded as a passive activity), nor is it creative work in a purely 
aesthetic sense. It is a kind of political, educative, and artistic work which cultivates new 
subjects and objects by striving to realize utopian principles and visions within conditions of 
constraint which themselves contain dimensions which are open to change (ibid., pp. 257, 
261). 
 
The Front as a laboratory for revolutionary, practical–critical activity 
 
If spaces of possibility in neoliberal societies are contracted by a ‘hopelessness-generating 
apparatus’ that can social criticism and freeze the imagination in a ‘climate of fear, jingoistic 
conformity and despair,’ as David Graeber (2009) contends, then it stands to reason that we 
can create alternative possibility-enabling environments. Indeed, all democratic traditions are 
premised on a faith that people have ‘the capacity…for intelligent judgement and action if the 
proper conditions are furnished’ (Dewey 1939, p. 243). But is not straightforward to create 
conditions of possibility for democratic life; even less so within and against non-democratic 
institutions and systems of power. The presence of social conditions does not guarantee 
desired ends and cannot, in either anticipation or retrospect, be determined to be the cause of 
any. Conditions of possibility are therefore slippery, morphing, grail-like things; not stable 
13 
 
and objective but, like the effects we believe they produce, relational and undetermined in a 
process of becoming. There are conditions that we cannot know and others that will have 
been necessary even though we cannot even yet conceive them. Inevitably, one critical 
condition of possibility is us (Gibson–Graham 2006). 
 
Consider the difficulty of determining the possibility-enabling potential of something many 
people take for granted: learning. Creating and discovering new things are generally thought 
of as pleasurable and sometimes even liberating experiences. This belief goes unexamined in 
many varieties of radical democratic politics, critical education, and cultural work, all of 
which in turn emphasize the importance of cognitive, political, and ontological uncertainty in 
transformative experience. Being decentred is a condition for learning. But it may also be that 
‘since the new in this sense is not something we can master, something whose effects we can 
predict and control, it arouses fear and anxiety,’ and that the same thing which ‘makes it 
uncontrollable also makes it a highly suspicious and dubious source of normativity’ 
(Kompridis 2011, p. 257). Encountering something new can elicit ‘reasons for why we should 
mistrust the new or they can become the intellectual and affective conditions necessary for its 
emergence.’ While this fear may be ‘a sign that you are doing your transformational work 
well’ (in other words, that you have succeeded in unsettling power and occasioned it to 
react), the experience of throwing oneself into the world without guarantees of safe return, 
especially without practice, can deplete or invert the transformative potential of the 
experience (Shor in Shor and Freire 2003, p. 482). In other words, the conditions that make 
one thing possible will have been conditioned, and they in turn conditioned, ad infinitum, in 
ways that can be difficult to trace. Because ‘while our possibilities cannot be fixed, we can 
become transfixed by a certain set of already disclosed possibilities’ (Kompridis 2011, p. 
259). 
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As there is no way to know in advance precisely how this ongoing conditioning of 
possibilities will work because it is always in process, we cannot presume that specific 
conditions of possibility which make sense today will endure into the future (Dewey 1938, 
pp. 47–49).  The more we try to describe conditions of possibility empirically, the more they 
‘cease to be of an order such that could be described objectively’ (Merleau-Ponty 1968, p. 
21). In recent years, this indeterminacy of conditions for political strategies that can 
counteract capitalist power has evoked hypotheses that conditions of possibility for success 
are ‘alchemic’ and can only be explained by the presence of some sort of dark matter or ‘fairy 
dust.’ This term, which is used particularly by anarchist activists and theorists to account for 
the x-factor in revolutionary political mobilization, had its origins in creative practice. The 
Free Association explains: 
 
‘There’s a famous bootleg tape of the 1960s band The Troggs having a hilariously 
sweary argument at a recording session. The sound engineer, who failed to press stop 
on the tape player, captured the band trying desperately to grasp what turns any 
particular song into a hit record. The conclusion they reached is now legendary: “You 
got to put a little bit of fucking fairy dust over the bastard.” […] When we seek to go 
beyond what seems possible, analysis can only take us so far.’ (Free Association 
2011) 
 
However, acknowledging a role for chance ‘doesn’t mean just trusting to luck.’ Even the 
Troggs knew that fairy dust needed to settle somewhere: ‘I know that it needs strings,’ said 
the guitarist; ‘that I do know.’ Using alchemy as a metaphor to describe what happens 
between possibility and its realization is one way of theorizing, ‘in a materialist way…about 
15 
 
things that normally evade analysis’ (ibid., 2011). It calls attention to how bringing ideas, 
people, and materials together in freely experimental ways can have unpredictable and often 
inexplicable results. It also recognizes both the ‘disaster character’ and the ‘hope character’ 
of possibility, privileging surprise over both bliss and fear. What it lacks is a theory of how 
possibility itself is – or indeed, that it can be – disclosed and generated in practice.  
 
Understanding how possibility is generated requires a different conceptual apparatus from the 
ones we use to solve practical problems in everyday life; different conceptualizations of both 
‘condition’ (in particular the condition of matter) and ‘possibility.’ For example, the 
assumption that what appears to exist in the world as fixed and intractable is in fact so (i.e., a 
prejudice that ‘there is no alternative’ to a status quo due to the nature of its status-quo-ness or 
to a human being due to her ‘nature’) is a fatalistic knowledge of possibility. It presumes, 
though often not in an articulated way, that human beings, social relationships, and material 
and materialized artefacts (including of space and time) are static and self-evident. Such logic 
underpins beliefs that in societies dominated by capitalist, technological, and authoritarian 
rationalities and institutions it is not possible to abolish or replace these systems of power, or 
to make space for radical subjectivities and alternative practices to emerge from within them. 
Freedom of thought and movement and the emergence of possibility, however, are only 
possible if people ‘perceive the reality of oppression not as a closed world from which there is 
no exit, but as a limiting situation which they can transform’ (Freire 2000, p. 49). The belief 
that such acts are impossible in principle, the negation of possibility, is thus the hopeless 
underside of what Bloch called ‘formal possibility’ – an unfounded theory that all things are 
possible in principle and, in consequence, that anything conceivable should always be 
possible.  
 
16 
 
An alternative to both ‘structural enclosure’ (total stasis or determinism) and ‘extreme non-
contingency’ (absolute freedom) in social life is to regard matter and possibility as relational 
(Bloch 1995, p. 234). This locates the genesis of possibility not in ‘objective’ conditions or 
‘subjective’ will, but in their mutual transformation through activities that bring them into 
encounter with one another: ‘processus cum figures, figurae in processu’ (the process is made 
by those who are made by the process), and it is a messy and experimental affair. 
Transformations of the self and of the world are interdependent; as Bloch writes, ‘possibility 
here in fact means both internal, active capability and external, passive capability-of-being-
done; therefore, capability-of-being-other falls into capability-of-doing-other and capability-
of-becoming-other’ (ibid., p. 232). The process of realizing possibility means working to 
bring together ‘the unenclosed potency to turn things here [and] the objective factor [of] the 
unenclosed potentiality of the turnability, changeability of the world within the framework of 
its laws, its laws which are however also legally variable under new conditions’ (ibid., p. 
247). These are interwoven, as one cannot exist without the other: ‘[W]ithout the potentiality 
of the capability-of-becoming-other, neither the capability-of-doing-other of potency would 
have space, nor, without the capability-of-doing-other of potency, would the capability-of 
becoming-other of the world have a sense which could be mediated with human beings’ 
(ibid., p. 233). 
 
This approach is underpinned by a prefigurative ontology, a theory of the social world which 
regards human beings, social and material conditions, and historical processes as ‘unclosed’ 
and ‘unfinished,’ and which privileges the knowledge, sensibilities, and social and political 
arts that generate or disclose the possibility of their transformation in seemingly foreclosed 
situations. ‘Real possibility,’ wrote Bloch,  
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‘does not reside in any ready-made ontology of the being of That-Which-Is up to now, 
but in the ontology, which must constantly be grounded anew, of the being of That-
Which-Is-Not-Yet, which discovers future even in the past and in the whole of nature. 
[…] [It is] the categorical In-Front-of-Itself of material movement considered as a 
process…’ (1995, p. 237).  
 
For Bloch, this process included even the material dimensions of reality (being, therefore, not 
matter but ‘unenclosed process-matter’) (ibid., pp. 235, 236). He distinguished between 
different temporalities of matter: that which has been, that which is just now, and most 
importantly, that which is ‘not-yet’ – incubating, or emerging over a horizon of intelligibility. 
For Bloch, the not-yet was not a utopic category of the future but a material force of past, 
present, and future. This is grounded in a materialist argument in which ‘men are products of 
circumstances and upbringing, and that, therefore, changed men are products of changed 
circumstances and changed upbringing,’ but also that ‘it is men who change circumstances 
and that the educator must himself be educated. […] The coincidence of the changing of 
circumstances and of human activity or self-change [Selbstveränderung] can be conceived 
and rationally understood only as revolutionary practice’ (Marx 1845, 3rd thesis on 
Feuerbach). This integration of self and social transformation distinguishes revolutionary 
(and, I suggest, radically democratic) action from humanist and reformist forms in the 
following way:  
 
‘Humanism is based on the desire to change the ideological system without altering 
institutions; and reformers wish to change the institution without touching the 
ideological system. Revolutionary action, on the contrary, is defined as the 
simultaneous agitation of consciousness and institutions; this implies that we attack 
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the relationships of power through the notions and institutions that function as their 
instruments, armature, and armor’ (Foucault 1971). 
 
The most potentially transformative kind of activity is that which can recognize ‘undecided’ 
and ‘precarious’ material in the present and work to shape its formation – including by 
creating such material through challenging that which appears as ‘decided’ or fixed. Indeed, 
he argued that courage to hope comes not from confidence of doing something risky with a 
chance of success, but from cultivating a courageous ‘attitude towards undecided material’ in 
the world (Bloch 1995, p. 199). This attitude is critical and appreciative; sensitive both to 
minute distortions of possibility and to the most ephemeral and tentative indications of its 
presence. While such work is not common, it is ubiquitous. Bloch sought examples of it in 
periods of revolutionary change (in bodies, conceptual horizons, or political regimes); it 
characterizes much of what progressive educators define as ‘learning.’ Later chapters in this 
book will examine examples of frontier politics in radical-democratic education and other 
forms of critical cultural work. To conclude this chapter, I will focus on an exemplary form 
of frontier politics which I believe demonstrates the power of prefigurative materialism in 
both spectacular and everyday ways: the militantly optimistic struggles to abolish slavery, 
lynching, segregation, incarceration, and all forms of racial dictatorship in the United States. 
Through this we also encounter a new concept, the ‘arc of justice,’ which opens conceptual 
space for thinking critically about the temporalities of radical-democratic practices and 
revolutionary social change. 
 
Abolition politics and the ‘arc towards justice’ 
‘We aren't going to let any mace stop us. We are masters in our nonviolent 
movement in disarming police forces. They don't know what to do. I've seen them so 
often. I remember in Birmingham, Alabama, when we were in that majestic struggle 
there, we would move out of the Sixteenth Street Baptist Church day after day. By 
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the hundreds we would move out, and Bull Connor would tell them to send the dogs 
forth, and they did come. But we just went before the dogs singing, "Ain't gonna let 
nobody turn me around." Bull Connor next would say, "Turn the fire hoses on." And 
as I said to you the other night, Bull Connor didn't know history. He knew a kind of 
physics that somehow didn't relate to the trans-physics that we knew about. And that 
was the fact that there was a certain kind of fire that no water could put out. And we 
went before the fire hoses.’ 
 
Martin Luther King, Jr. (1968) 
 
 
‘The impossible will take a little while.’ 
 
 Billie Holiday (Loeb 2014) 
 
 
The annals of people’s history – shared testimonies of how the world-making power of 
human beings is organized into struggles for humanization, dignity, and justice in the face of 
anti-democratic power, and how they free themselves from determination by cultivating 
various practices of freedom together – offer an education in the politics of possibility. As the 
U.S. historian Howard Zinn (2004) once pointed out, ‘we forget how often we have been 
astonished by the sudden crumbling of institutions, by extraordinary changes in people’s 
thoughts, by unexpected eruptions of rebellion against tyrannies, by the quick collapse of 
systems of power that seemed invincible.’ We forget about the incredible variety of non-
hegemonic, ‘minor,’ and alternative forms of life with which we co-exist; forget, too, about 
the many defeats and disappointments which have been engaged as opportunities to 
participate more and differently; to begin again (Gibson–Graham 2006). 
 
In this section, I aim to illustrate how prefigurative materialist modes of frontier may be 
practiced through the lens of abolition politics. While I do not suggest that abolition 
movements past and present are representative of this form, or that they can or should be 
generalized or co-opted to others, the tradition offers some particularly clarifying examples of 
what it means to re-read an ostensibly fixed state of domination as open to transformation, to 
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generate fronts of possibility, to work towards and on these fronts, and to cultivate an 
alternative sense of political time which allows political urgency and revolutionary patience to 
co-exist. An examination of the potential relationships between radical democracy and 
abolitionist forms of the politics of possibility is also timely as it has recently been a matter of 
interest in counter-capitalist activist communities, particularly those associated with Occupy 
and its satellite movements and amongst groups and networks campaigning for the abolition 
of work, money, the use of fossil fuel, and debt (as well as longer-running campaigns to 
abolish the prison, capital punishment and compulsory schooling). Some observers make a 
direct connection between the newest counter-capitalist movements and abolitionist traditions, 
including arguments that there is a ‘chain of resonance from the Haitian revolutionaries 
through the US Abolitionists and Reconstructionists down to today’s critiques of the prison-
industrial complex and the global justice movements,’ and that ‘implicit in the Occupy 
movement was the renewal of what W. E. B. Du Bois called “abolition democracy”’ (Du Bois 
1935a; Mirzoeff 2013). 
 
This is also because, as I will explain below, abolition is a normative and strategic frame 
which allows people not only to call for the reform or transformation of existing 
circumstances, but to take a ‘radical stance…announcing [the] obsolescence’ of a particular 
state of affairs and organization of social life, and the necessary possibility of another. It is a 
politics that asserts the non-necessity, unfinishedness and political constitution of the world-
as-it-is and the reality of an alternative that may not yet be possible to instantly imagine or 
create. It is not embarrassed to argue that fundamental changes to major social institutions, 
hegemonic cultural norms, and comfortable social and political subjectivities are unlikely to 
happen through reform or by creating anew as if from scratch; rather, it permits saying that in 
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some situations radical transformation is required before subsequent reforms can become 
possible.  
 
The abolitionist politics discussed here are rooted in the long struggles to abolish the African 
and indigenous American slave trade and chattel slavery in the UK and US during the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and in subsequent and ongoing movements to abolish 
white supremacist legal powers, racial segregation, and all systemic causes of racial violence 
in the US during the twentieth. It took more than a century of political, legal, and cultural 
struggle to abolish slavery in the United States. It took nearly another to put an end to the 
legally sanctioned lynching of black people and of public and institutional segregation across 
the country. Today, the movement to abolish racial dictatorship is far from finished, and the 
abolitionist tradition remains alive in contemporary anti-racist struggles, including through the 
abolition of the prison and the ‘abolition of white democracy’ (Davis 2003; Olsen 2004). As 
Angela Davis points out in advocating for the abolition (rather than the reform) of the 
American prison, ‘slavery, lynching, and segregation are certainly compelling examples of 
social institutions that…were once considered to be as everlasting as the sun. Yet, in the case 
of all three examples, we can point to movements that assumed the radical stance of 
announcing the obsolescence of those institutions’ (Davis 2003, p. 24).3 
 
In 1857, the African-American abolitionist Frederick Douglass highlighted the necessity of 
this radical stance to an audience of mostly white abolitionists. They had gathered to debate 
the emancipation of slaves in the West Indies, and many were critical of both slave revolts 
and black-led resistance movements in the United States. ‘Power concedes nothing without 
demands,’ Douglass said, and ‘the limits of tyrants are prescribed by the endurance of those 
whom they oppress.’ Then: 
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‘The whole history of the progress of human liberty shows that all concessions yet 
made to her august claims have been born of earnest struggle. The conflict has been 
exciting, agitating, all-absorbing, and for the time being, putting all other tumults to 
silence. It must do this or it does nothing. If there is no struggle there is no progress. 
Those who profess to favor freedom and yet deprecate agitation are men who want 
crops without ploughing up the ground; they want rain without thunder and lightning. 
They want the ocean without the awful roar of its many waters.’ 
 
Freedom, according to Douglass, was an artefact of transformations of consciousness and 
action; a cumulative effect of moments when people striving for democratic possibility have 
realized that even small improvements are sustained and extended through fundamental and 
wide-reaching changes, and vice versa. It is also a product of enormous amounts of practical, 
often mundane, work to transform knowledge systems and rationalities, organizing principles 
of economic and political affairs, and social relationships – in other words, to alter both the 
conditions and the parameters of possibility.  
 
Eighty years later, as the struggle to establish conditions for black emancipation in the US 
continued, the African-American sociologist W. E. B. Du Bois again drew attention to the 
pivotal role of radical social reconstruction in the abolitionist project, which he argued would 
continue to reproduce the conditions of slavery and the conditions of possibility for slavery as 
long as it assumed only their negation. Following legal emancipation, he argued, black people 
faced recovery from ‘one of the most stupendous efforts the world ever saw to discredit 
human beings, an effort involving universities, history, science, social life and religion,’ as 
well as (and most explicitly) labour and political institutions (Du Bois 1935a, p. 727). All of 
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these were therefore recognized as important sites of struggle in the movement, and as 
important sites for the creation of fronts of possibility. And this possibility was not only 
understood as being co-operatively produced, but unfolding in a trans-generational political 
time which exceeded the life spans of many individuals who were involved. Nearly a century 
after Douglass delivered his speech in New York, for example, and three decades after Du 
Bois was writing the Reverend Martin Luther King, Jr. addressed another audience of civil 
rights activists in Alabama. His theme was the radical re-imagination of the temporality of 
democratization. 
 
‘I know you are asking today, "How long will it take?" 
 
Somebody’s asking, "How long will prejudice blind the visions of men, darken their 
understanding, and drive bright-eyed wisdom from her sacred throne?"  
 
Somebody’s asking, "When will wounded justice, lying prostrate on the streets of 
Selma and Birmingham and communities all over the South, be lifted from this dust 
of shame to reign supreme among the children of men?"  
 
Somebody’s asking, "When will the radiant star of hope be plunged against the 
nocturnal bosom of this lonely night, plucked from weary souls with chains of fear 
and the manacles of death? How long will justice be crucified, and truth bear it?"  
 
[…] 
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How long? Not long, because the arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends 
toward justice’ (King 1965). 
 
King understood it was difficult for people to believe, in the midst and wake of so much 
collective suffering and trauma, that a tendency towards justice exists; people for whom so 
much time had passed in which there was, as Bertolt Brecht had lamented of a different time, 
‘only injustice and no outrage.’ He knew that it was essential for people to understand that 
there were actually existing pasts and possible futures in which this was not the case. 
Alongside the actuality of ‘transphysics’ (the spiritual experience of speaking truth to power 
with the body), he employed pedagogical techniques to make this tendency more visible; for 
example, by situating the twentieth-century American civil rights movement within a longer 
trajectory of successful struggles for human freedom and recognition: Biblical stories of 
liberation, the development of democratic philosophy in ancient Greece, the aesthetic 
contributions of the Renaissance, the challenging of religious repression during the 
Reformation, the emancipation of slaves in the United States, and the vindication of humanist 
values against economic greed during the Great Depression. King could have imagined 
utopias, but in order to reveal their leading edges in lived experience, he attempted to locate 
fronts of possibility in the past. This method of unclosing the future by visibilizing its 
contingency in the past creates a counter-map of possibility which is drawn not by delineating 
the limits of possibility but by identifying the co-ordinates and contours of their 
transgressions. For King, militant optimism and educated hope were keystones supporting an 
‘arcing’ towards justice in continually dark times.  
 
The history of abolition therefore illustrates that we cannot judge the significance of discrete 
actions or experiences within the trajectory of an historical project on the basis of its status as 
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an action or experience in isolation from others. The project of abolishing one form of social 
life and creating another, perhaps over generations, involves some ‘exciting, agitating [and] 
all-absorbing’ experiences, as well as moments or periods that feel like failure or like nothing 
at all. Projects of this magnitude necessitate ongoing learning about the complex nature, 
uncertain temporality, and ‘untested feasibility’ of collective efforts to transform deep 
structures of social, cultural, and economic order, and to generate new ways of thinking and 
being in the absence of empirical evidence that they will become social realities (Freire 2000, 
p. 102; see also footnote 9). Announcing the obsolescence of a hegemonic historical project is 
a radicalizing act not only when it enables ‘earnest struggle’ to advance another move, but 
because even when its effects cannot be immediately known or verified such critique 
generates spaces of possibility. It also invites us to cultivate a radically democratic kind of  
 
‘decision to believe in what people can be on the basis of what they sometimes are. It 
is the decision to believe that each polity and each person contains the possibility of a 
democratic version of itself. It is the belief that as people are free, they are free to 
become that, too. None of this has been proved, but neither can it be disproved. The 
move to embrace democratic faith gives one hope and the ability to act, without self-
deception about the actual state of things. The gap between the possibility in which 
the democrat believes and the reality that we have is a wide one; among leaps of faith, 
this is a long one. That is why, of all faiths, it needs to be the strongest’ (Lummis 
1996, p. 153).  
 
Frontier politics and radical democracy 
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Abolition is a politics of possibility that works towards an on the front; a mode of political 
practice concerned with what happens at the ‘leading edges’ of possibility. Its raison d’être is 
to counteract foreclosures of possibility; to create conditions for counter-hegemonic ways of 
thinking, living, and being to germinate, sprout, and grow roots; and ultimately to re-
delineate the parameters of what it is possible to think, say, do, be, and imagine. It is not 
surprising that there is a regeneration of interest in this spirit of radical-democratic frontier 
work in neoliberal societies today. Many things which are associated with the idea of radical 
democracy – an intolerance of foreclosure, a preference for the oppressed and the minor and 
the margin and the crack, an interest in substances over appearances and fundamentals over 
symptoms, political and intellectual autonomy from the bottom-up, non-instrumentalized 
relations of collectivity and affinity, egalitarian and horizontal forms of economic and social 
organization, the encouragement of creative experimentation, receptivity to otherness and that 
which is new, a grounding in diverse bodies and identities, a commitment to learning through 
study and practice, an acceptance of the ethical responsibilities of democracy itself, and 
above all a commitment to the ordinary and extraordinary work of building real utopias in the 
present – are simultaneously counter-neoliberal in form an substance, and means for 
countering neoliberal forms of power. Radical democracy, argues Henry Giroux, ‘must resist 
all closure while at the same time arguing for those principles and institutions "in which the 
democratic ideals of equality, freedom and popular control are allowed their most complete 
sway and fullest application"’ (Giroux 2013, citing Keenan 1997).  
 
Perhaps most importantly, the notion of frontier politics grounds the ambition of changing 
selves and changing worlds in practice wherever we are; we can find a front at ‘every site that 
exists as potentiality’ (Gibson–Graham 2006, p. xxxiii). The promises of radical 
democratization are not the privilege of a few experts in ‘radicalism,’ but everyone’s. They 
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are for people who need or wish to live in opposition to oppression and foreclosure, and who 
want to be on the front of emerging alternatives. They belong to all those, as Dewey once 
wrote, who desire 'a ‘freer and more human experience in which all share and to which all 
contribute’ (1939, p. 232).  
 
How can we move from reproducing habitual routines and theories and strategies of change 
to participating in more radically democratic activities, and from experiencing ‘fugitive’ 
states of democracy to living more radically democratic lives? How can we create conditions 
in which radically democratic possibilities emerge and thrive? How do we find the Front? 
Chapter 4 begins to answer these questions by examining some of the major forms of radical 
democracy, considering why they are counterhegemonic political forms, and exploring why 
they potentials of radical democracy are profound and fragile. 
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regarding a white politician’s response to the creation of schools for black children in 
the south. ‘It was soon after the war that a white member of Johnson's re-stored 
Louisiana legislature passed one of the schools set up by the Freedmen's Bureau in 
New Orleans. The grounds were filled with children. He stopped and looked intently, 
and then asked, "Is this a school?" "Yes," was the reply. "What, for niggers?" 
"Evidently." He threw up his hands. "Well, well," he said, "I have seen many an 
absurdity in my lifetime, but this is the climax!"’ (DuBois 1935, p. 247) 
 
